Somalia and Somaliland: Ruminations on an Interim Settlement Process by Jama, Mohamud A
ȲȲǯȱŗŝ
74
Somalia and Somaliland: Ruminations 
on an Interim Settlement Process
Mohamud A. Jama
1. Introduction
This short meditation explores Somalia’s post-independence experi-
ment in nation building and governance and its path to failure. This 
is followed by a review of the approaches and strategies of external 
interventions. The piece concludes that current strategies of interven-
tions and state building do not inspire solutions to the Somali enigma. 
Instead, it proposes strategy for an interim settlement process that can 
be a framework for mediating a pragmatic roadmap for the beginning 
of a viable interim settlement process.
II. The Pan-Somali Experiment in State Building
Political developments in Somalia during the first three decades of 
statehood fall into three distinct phases: 
1. An experiment in organizing pan-Somali democratic state  
 building, 1961–1969 
2. The autocratic military junta, which deinstitutionalized the first  
 decade’s democratization, 1969–1979 
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3. The path to failure: autocratic clan-based factional rule and  
 clan-based insurgencies, 1980–1991 
A. The Union of Somalia and Somaliland Revisited
The union of Somalia and Somaliland, after their simultaneous inde-
pendence, was part of a pan-Somali vision to reverse the colonial 
partition of the Somali inhabited territories in Northeast Africa. On 
July 1, 1960, Somalia and Somaliland united and formed the Somali 
Republic. Their successful political integration during the first decade 
of independence was part of the wider pan-Somali vision of creating 
Greater Somalia. This vision enabled the two territories to overcome 
many challenges of integrating two territories that had different, that 
is British and Italian, colonial traditions reflected in the languages of 
their administration and medium of instruction in their public schools. 
These distinct traditions shaped the orientation of their respective 
elites. Both inherited weak institutional and physical infrastructure 
that posed additional challenges to their political integration and eco-
nomic development. 
The Act of Union established a unitary state and conceived the 
nation as a union of Somaliland (Northern Somalia) and the six regions 
of Southern Somalia. Somaliland’s 33-member parliament was incorpo-
rated into the much larger 90-member parliament of Southern Soma-
lia.1,2 The interim president of the Southern regions was elected as 
the first president of Somalia in 1961. He in turn appointed one of the 
members of parliament from the Southern regions as his prime minis-
ter. The appointments to the key cabinet positions and senior manage-
ment civil service positions reflected the respective shares of the two 
territories in the parliament. The administrative language remained 
Italian, handicapping candidates from the former British Somaliland in 
public sector employment. 
Mogadishu, almost 2000 miles to the south of Somaliland, became 
the national capital. The centralization of government and public 
administration relegated Somaliland to the periphery and accentuated 
the inaccessibility of the services of the central government and finan-
cial institutions. Public sector employment was also concentrated in 
the capital as were opportunities for scholarship, which were vehicles 
for mobility. 
Despite the early signs of disaffection in Somaliland with the imbal-
ances in the Act of Union,3  the new state held democratic parliamen-
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service and a larger number of the unemployed and nomads, who 
were rendered destitute by the drought of 1973, migrated to the Gulf 
States. The combination of repressive policies and lucrative employ-
ment opportunities in the Gulf intensified the migration and created 
vibrant diaspora communities. Remittances from the migrant work-
ers were channeled through private businesses, which used them to 
finance imports of basic staples. The remittances eased some of the 
economic difficulties the country faced.
By 1976, the regime had intensified consolidation of its power. It 
established a political party modeled after the Soviet bloc approach 
to political regimentation and mounted a pan-Somali campaign to 
support its preparations for war with Ethiopia. In the early phase of 
the military campaign, the regime provided military equipment and 
logistical support to operations of the Western Somali Liberation Front 
in the Ogaden. The Somali army gradually increased deployment of 
strategic units to destroy forward garrisons of the Ethiopian army 
throughout the Somali-inhabited regions of Ethiopia. 
The Soviet Union, the principal supplier to the military and sup-
porter of the regime, opposed the invasion. Cuba and the Soviet Union 
offered to mediate an accord on the broad Horn of Africa and Yemen. 
Somalia rejected the offers of mediation and terminated its treaty of 
friendship with the Soviet Union signed in 1974. The Soviet Union 
responded by organizing a large-scale airlift of armaments for Ethiopia 
and mobilized military contingents from Cuba and South Yemen to 
support the Ethiopian army. These combined forces forced the Somali 
military units to withdraw. 
Some of the retreating units of the Somali army attempted a coup, 
which was suppressed. About a dozen of the coup leaders were exe-
cuted, but one of its key leaders escaped to Kenya and later to Ethiopia 
to form, with the support of the Ethiopian government, the first armed 
resistance group. The defeat of the Somali army also led to a large-
scale exodus of ethnic Somali and Oromo refugees. These were orga-
nized as paramilitary forces to support the regime. 
C. The Path to Failure: Autocratic Rule and Clan-Based Insurgencies
The aftermath of the Ogaden war and the abortive April 1978 coup 
d’état by some of the retreating units of the Somali Army prompted the 
regime to rely on the support and loyalty of clan-based cliques. Key 
leaders of the military regime were purged and imprisoned. These acts 
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and growing repression in the 1980s increased disaffection with the 
regime policies and leadership.4 The leaders of the diaspora commu-
nities in the Gulf States mobilized clan-based opposition movements. 
Leaders of the opposition moved to Ethiopia, which armed and sup-
ported these groups.5 Dissidents against the order went into exile or 
defected to the opposition movements in Ethiopia.6
By the mid-1980s, the leadership of the opposition groups was in 
Ethiopia and mounted operations against the regime in border areas. 
The regime responded with large-scale attacks in rural areas. The esca-
lating violence transformed rural border communities into internally 
displaced groups. Others sought asylum in Ethiopia and were resettled 
on the Ethiopian side of the border. The civil war entered a decisive 
phase in 1988, as the rebels in the north launched simultaneous and 
daring attacks in three of the principal towns. The regime responded 
with merciless reprisals against civilians and set in motion the depopu-
lation of the urban areas. The affected urban civilian population joined 
internally displaced communities in their traditional homelands or 
sought asylum as refugees in Ethiopia.
The cruelty of the state response to the 1988 insurgency operations 
in the Northern regions magnified internal alienation and resistance 
to the regime. Two Southern opposition movements were established 
in 1989. This led to large-scale defections from the army to the militias 
of the insurgency movement. The new opposition movements estab-
lished bases in Ethiopia. The three movements launched coordinated 
operations in the middle of 1990 and triggered parallel insurrections in 
the capital and provincial towns. 
III. External Responses to the Collapse of the State
In the final stage of the civil strife, the army abandoned the regime 
and soldiers joined their respective clan militia. The supporters of the 
regime formed militias of their sub-clans. With the collapse of the 
regime, Somalia and Somaliland broke into the two pre-union states 
that formed the Somali Republic following their independence on June 
26 and July 1, 1960, respectively. In Somalia, cliques of the clan-based 
insurgency movements formed two unstable coalitions of rival cliques 
of the different sub-clans. This intensified the inter-communal conflicts 
and political fragmentation, resulting in the outflow of refugees into 
Kenya. 
In contrast, the leaders of Somaliland responded to the failure of the 
regime as an opportunity to reverse the fatal flaws of the Act of Union 
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and undo the legacies of the civil strife and autocratic military rule. 
The leaders of the principal Northern insurgency movement and the 
leaders of regional clan communities started preparatory consultations 
on convening a reconciliation conference to end the conflicts between 
opponents and supporters of the regime and map out strategies for 
building political consensus on Somaliland’s future political path. 
The conference was convened as parallel ad hoc assemblies of the 
traditional leaders and other civil society representatives and policy 
organs of the Northern insurgency movement, the Somali National 
Movement (SNM). The traditional leaders collectively recommended 
the restoration of the pre-union status of Somaliland as an indepen-
dent state. The conference also mandated that the leaders of the SNM 
serve as an interim government for a two-year transition period. 
A. Humanitarian and Peace Enforcement Interventions
The political upheavals in Southern Somalia led to a breakdown of 
basic economic activities, which coincided with the incidence of a 
drought, resulting in a humanitarian crisis that threatened nearly two 
million people in southwestern Somalia, the epicenter of the drought. 
The first generation of international responses to the collapse of the 
regime was launched in response to factional conflicts and drought-
induced humanitarian crisis. In its first action, the UN Security Council 
imposed a complete arms embargo. In later resolutions, the Security 
Council ordered a ceasefire between the warring factions in Mogadi-
shu and mandated deployment of 50 observers to monitor it. This was 
later expanded to 3,500 peacekeepers, tasked to implement humanitar-
ian drought response recommended by a UN technical team.
On December 3, 1992, in response to the deteriorating humanitarian 
and security situation, the UN Security Council authorized a U.S.-led 
multinational task force to create a secure environment for the delivery 
of humanitarian supplies and to protect the international relief work-
ers. The task force is credited with saving the lives of several thousand 
civilians and stabilizing the humanitarian situation. The operation was 
transferred to the United Nations as a UN Peacekeeping Operation 
in Somalia, UNOSOM II. The UN relief operation faced attacks on its 
relief supplies and armed resistance from one of the principal factions. 
The confrontation expanded into a violent counterinsurgency opera-
tion and led to the erosion of international support. Following a review 
of the operation, the UN Security Council endorsed the recommenda-
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tion of the Secretary-General to terminate the operation. Over the 10 
years following the end of the operation in March 1995, the UN main-
tained a political office for Somalia in Nairobi, Kenya. The office was 
mandated to monitor political developments in Somalia. 
B. Kin-Based State-Building Initiatives
The resolution terminating the UN operations also invited regional 
states to lead future reconciliations in Somalia. This prompted failed 
attempts by Egypt and Ethiopia. The failure of the Egyptian and Ethio-
pian initiatives set the stage for a reconciliation conference sponsored 
by the government of Djibouti. The conference formed a Transitional 
National Government (TNG), but the leaders of key factions either did 
not attend the conference or opposed its outcome. In 2002, member 
states of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 
sponsored a second conference mandated to facilitate inclusion of the 
dissenting faction leaders in the government, but Kenya and Ethiopia 
modified the proceedings and splintered the leadership of a fragile 
TNG. 
The conference was organized into three phases. The first phase 
mediated a comprehensive cessation of all hostilities. The second 
phase adopted a Transitional Federal Charter (TFC). The third and 
final phase of the conference adopted a formula of clan representation 
in a transitional federal parliament and the procedure for the selection 
of its members. The parliament was inaugurated in August 2004 and 
set the stage for the election of key leaders to the federal government, 
the President and Speaker of the parliament, and the nomination and 
approval of a Prime Minister and his cabinet. 
The TFC stipulated that members of the cabinet should be selected 
from among members of the parliament. The competition for appoint-
ment to the cabinet and key ministries renewed rivalry among 
clan-based factions. The donor partners of IGAD, who funded the 
two-year-long conference, did not provide funding for the relocation, 
installation, or security of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG).  
The TFG splintered into two rival wings and returned to separate 
locations. The Speaker and faction leaders in the cabinet returned to 
Mogadishu while the president and prime minister and their support-
ers established an interim administrative center in a rural provincial 
town 90 kilometers north of Mogadishu. Civil society groups and a 
network of Islamist groups that were locked out of the political process 
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during the conference and the formation of the government challenged 
both wings of the TFG. 
C. Counter-Terrorism Operations 
The opposition to the TFG coalesced as the Union of Islamic Courts 
(UIC), formed by local Islamic courts of law that operated in the capi-
tal. The UIC also gained support from leaders and militias of some 
sub-clans in regions adjacent to Mogadishu as well as financial sup-
port from charity groups in the Gulf States and from Somali dias-
pora groups in Europe and North America. The UIC and its allies 
challenged the faction leaders, who formed an anti-terrorist alliance 
with support from clandestine American intelligence operators. The 
Islamist militia mobilized political support against the faction leaders 
and the TFG leadership and evicted the faction leaders from the capi-
tal. The two wings of the TFG reunited and relocated in Baidoa, close 
to the Ethiopian border in southwestern Somalia.
By June 2006, the Islamists expanded to adjacent regions of the capi-
tal and were poised to attack the new headquarters of the TFG in 
Baidoa. Ethiopia viewed the Islamist groups as a threat to its security. 
In December 2006, Ethiopia intervened to stave off the collapse of the 
TFG and, subsequently, occupied Mogadishu. The Ethiopian interven-
tion forced the political leaders of the Islamists into exile. These leaders 
and some members of the Transitional Federal Parliament formed the 
Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), with headquarters in 
Asmara, Eritrea. The ARS appealed to Somali diaspora communities, 
which mounted political and fundraising campaigns on its behalf. The 
military wing of the Islamists retreated into rural areas. The two wings 
of the resistance movement continued their collaboration.  
The United Nations Political Office for Somalia, with the support 
of IGAD member states, launched mediation between the leaders of 
the Asmara-based wing of the ARS and the TFG. The mediation led 
to the Djibouti Peace Accord. The Accord reconstituted the TFG under 
the leadership of the Islamist wing of the ARS. The UN Political Office 
for Somalia and IGAD member states endorsed the Djibouti Peace 
Accord, which extended the tenure of the TFG for one year. Two years 
later, the International Contact Group, consisting of the UN Political 
Office for Somalia, the member states of IGAD, and donor representa-
tives, endorsed the Kampala Accord, which outlined a new roadmap 
for political transition and extended the tenure of the TFG to August 
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2012. This culminated in the election of a federal regime in September, 
replaced by another one, through the same procedure, in early 2017.
IV. The Somali Kinship System: Pillar of Civil Society  
and Driver of Factional Conflicts
The constitutional, political, and institutional arrangements of Somalia 
and Somaliland define and regulate the role of clans in the election 
process. The list below outlines the dynamics and functions of the clan 
system in Somali society and politics. 
Clans as Pillars of Somali Civil Society and  
Drivers of Factional Conflicts
In traditional Somali societies, the kinship system serves as a pillar of civil 
society and mechanism of conflict resolution. But the political vacuum 
created by the collapse of the state transformed the Somali-kinship social 
organization into a platform for political action and governance.
• In periods of stability, clan affiliation supports national identity.
• Cross-clan political coalitions formed during periods of conflict are  
 highly unstable and change as the scale or nature of the conflict  
 changes.
• Loyalty to larger kinship groups (clans and sub-clans) become  
 subsumed in competing territorial claims that lead to the fragmen- 
 tation of regional and district constituencies. 
• Political competition among the leadership factions activate clan  
 mobilization and set the stage for subversion of the rule of law and  
 faction-driven violence. 
• Governing factions manipulate and fragment opposition by  
 appointing opponents to second and third tier leadership positions. 
• During conflicts, clan affiliation serves as a platform of autocratic rule  
 and resistance. 
• In periods of extreme internal conflict, external actors are incorporated  
 in competing clan alliances.
• Kinship-based cliques of different clans act as platforms for competi- 
 tion in national political officesǯȱ
• Political fragmentation increases the vulnerability of the democrati- 
 zation process to external interventions. 
• Ad hoc electoral caucuses of different clans in Somalia and clan-based  
 electoral associations in Somaliland effectively weaken accountability  
 of officials and increase the vulnerability of government institutions to  
 patronage, corruption, and instability.
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V. Somalia and Somaliland: Divergence and Juridical Disputes
During the last 25 years, Somalia and Somaliland have pursued sepa-
rate political tracks to restore basic governmental institutions. In Soma-
lia, the federal government and the constituent states of the federation 
are based on a kin-centered system of representation. At the central 
level, the tribalist system of representation has fostered unstable coali-
tions and deadly internal rivalries among the cliques. The recurrent 
factional disputes have weakened inclusive government and under-
mined the reconciliation process, which was the primary reason for its 
adoption.
Somaliland transitioned from clan-based representation to a multi-
party electoral system but, like Somalia, its political factions evolved 
into kinship-based entities.7 Caucuses of sub-clans served as a mecha-
nism for selecting party candidates in the multi-party electoral con-
tests. These ad hoc kinship caucuses serve as platforms for organizing 
political parties. Hence, in both Somalia and Somaliland, kin-based 
competition effectively drives the political process and greatly impedes 
effective governance. In Somalia, competition for political office is 
decided in kinship-based caucuses within sub-clans. 
Somaliland and Somalia both postponed the election scheduled for 
2016. In Somaliland, presidential and parliamentary elections sched-
uled to be held in 2015 and then March 2016, only to push further to 
November 2017. The concurrent presidential and parliamentary elec-
tions of Somaliland Council of Deputies were split. A date for new 
elections of the members of the Council is now set for 2018. Both elec-
tions have been postponed as a result of the severe drought that led to 
large-scale population movement and poor logistical electoral prepara-
tions.
The tenure of Somalia’s federal executive branch and federal parlia-
ment in Mogadishu ended in August 2016, but the transition to direct 
democratic elections has been postponed to 2020. Procedures for indi-
rect elections of the two federal legislatures have been concluded in the 
midst of strong accusations of extraordinary corruption and manipu-
lation. The regions represent the future states of the federation. The 
existing regional states and their interim councils of sub-kin represen-
tatives were established through long, drawn-out external mediations 
among the leaders of rival factions within each of the regions. But the 
boundaries of all states remain hotly contested.8
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The conduct of elections in both Somalia and Somaliland under 
the current conditions will only entrench political disputes over the 
separation and reunification of Somalia and Somaliland. The explicit 
recognition of the unity and territorial integrity of Somalia incorpo-
rated in all of the resolutions of the UN Security Council9 encourages 
the leaders of the federal government and its states to pursue de facto 
incorporation of Somaliland in the federation process. This adds strate-
gies of governance as a source of legal disputes.  
The repetitive delays in democratic elections, relentless factional 
rivalries, and disputes over the boundaries of the constituent states are 
symptoms of the clan-based representation in federal state building. 
These are rooted in rival clan-based territorial claims of the constitu-
ent states of the federation. Somaliland’s scheduled presidential and 
parliamentary elections similarly experienced extensive delays as a 
consequence of acrimonious disagreements over electoral procedures 
and logistical difficulties. Somaliland also entered into a dialogue with 
leaders of dissent groups in parts of the eastern regions. The election 
delays are a measure of the serious flaws and contentions in strategies 
of governance and stabilization, and bode ill for the resolution of polit-
ical disputes on the future architecture of Somalia and Somaliland.
Somaliland’s electoral experiences illustrate challenges and lessons 
for democratization. The tenures of the elected presidents, Council 
of Deputies, and local government councils have been frequently 
extended beyond their original mandates. The political parties have 
become vehicles for unstable clan-based electoral coalitions. The selec-
tion of presidential candidates and their running mates have often 
become a source of internal political contestation within parties, which 
are resolved through ad hoc mediations by the Council of Elders. The 
extensions and the procedures that ended in extending tenures have 
greatly weakened the democratization and governance of Somaliland.
Somalia remains both fragmented and unsafe after more than 10 
years of an externally sponsored process of state building and the 
deployment of 22,000 African Union troops10 with UN political and 
logistical support11 and U.S. drone attacks. The militia of al Shabaab 
retains terrorist cells that give it the capacity to plan and mount suicide 
operations in the capital and other towns against the African Union 
troops. Moreover, they are also able to disrupt efforts to establish 
interim local administration in areas liberated from al Shabaab. The 
difficulties in rebuilding local government institutions illustrate the 
weakness and flaws of the federation as the basis of establishing politi-
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sional constitution and the basis of the joint assistance of the UN and 
African Union to state building in Somalia.
The international community can best support both Somalia and 
Somaliland by aligning their policies to facilitate a Somalia-Somaliland 
settlement accord. The current and recent UN and regional interven-
tions largely focus on the establishment of the constituent states of a 
federation and the elimination of the threats of al Shabaab to Somalia, 
its neighbors, and the international community. This has not built the 
foundation for a political agreement on governance among the con-
stituent states of the federation within Somalia nor have these inter-
ventions inspired solutions to the hard juridical and political disputes 
between Somalia and Somaliland. Instead, the leaders of states and 
the federal government both use their association with international 
counterinsurgency to gain legitimacy and support for their political 
and legal status.
VI. A Roadmap to an Interim Political Settlement
Both Somalia and Somaliland plan multi-party democratic elections 
during the next five years. This creates a window of opportunity to 
develop and align United Nations’ support for a settlement and democ-
ratization process. This would serve as an alternative to the divergent 
objectives of the parties that are locked in a political stalemate, which 
increases the risk to international peace support operations and could 
plant the seeds of future conflicts and instability.  
The kin-based representation and federal state building at the 
national and sub-national levels replicates the flaws in the 1960 Act of 
Union. Somalia’s officials and legislators are elected by clan caucuses 
and act as agents of their respective clans. Somaliland’s representatives 
in its federal political institutions are included in order to project and 
maintain the appearance of inclusivity.13 Somaliland’s self-exclusion 
from all international deliberations has led to de facto international 
support for Somalia’s approach to unity and has effectively denied 
Somaliland’s electorate the opportunity to influence international 
state-building deliberations. 
A. Elements of a Strategy for a Mediated Interim Settlement
I suggest a three-phase settlement process is proposed. The interim 
settlement outlines strategies that can be the basis for external media-
tions. 
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ministers, who relied on support from their respective clans. Since the 
inauguration of the Transitional Federal Government, Somalia has had 
five prime ministers and hundreds of cabinet ministers. The inclusion 
of Somaliland in the current state building paradigm will compound 
these political and complicated disputes. The failure of the Somali state 
is in part the political consequence of Somalia’s territorial conflicts with 
its neighbors. The settlement of the Somali crisis has therefore become 
regionalized and incorporated into the politics and security strategies 
of Somalia’s three immediate neighbors. The officials of Somalia and 
Somaliland both assign higher value to their relationships with the 
three neighboring countries than their relations with each other. The al 
Shabaab has emerged as a wedge in Somali reconciliation and a source 
of threat to regional security and a peaceful settlement of the Somali 
crisis.  
The agenda for the long-term settlement of the Somalia-Somaliland 
political disputes must therefore be part of the policies and strategies 
for defeating al Shabaab. It must also lead Somali acceptance of the 
borders with its neighbors. Somalia’s neighbors must reciprocate with 
inclusion of the two states or reunited Somalia as partners in regional 
economic and technical cooperation.
B. Final Status Arrangements: Final Reflections
Somalia and Somaliland need to choose between reunification and 
separation in order to end their juridical disputes and the intrusive 
external involvements, and to build a foundation for their security 
and long-term development. Both options pose serious challenges to 
governance and future stability. The options therefore need to be eval-
uated, not as victory and failure but in terms of their long-term conse-
quences. Both options pose short-term challenges but suggest a path 
to a sustainable long-term settlement.  The choice between Somalia’s 
goal of reunification and Somaliland’s conviction of a two-state solu-
tion must be peacefully and democratically decided by the electorates 
of Somaliland and Somalia. But the settlement process must be based 
on internationally accepted democratic standards and implemented in 
collaboration with the United Nations.
The federal reunification plan recreates the severe 1960 imbal-
ances in unification. Earlier, these shortcomings in the union quickly 
emerged. A majority of the Somaliland electorate voted against the 
referendum on the unification but the constitution was ratified on the 
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basis of a huge support of Southern voters.  In response, a group of 
young Somaliland officers attempted a coup in December 1961. These 
earlier attempts failed to reverse the union. The military junta and its 
later transformation into an alliance of three Darood sub-kin led to 
deep Northern alienation and subsequent insurgency that was to pio-
neer Somaliland’s departure. This act has become a covenant of recon-
ciliation and self-determination. The Somaliland kin representation in 
Mogadishu is structured as part of two of the major kin-groups. Their 
seats in the federal parliament account for 44 of 61 Dir representatives 
and 14 of 61 Darood representatives, thus Somaliland representatives 
account for 58 out of the 275 in the federal parliament. The Upper 
House allots 15 of 54 members. These numbers underscore the con-
tinuation of the great imbalance that destroyed the union.
Neither federalism as planned nor separation as Somaliland seeks 
provides the conditions for a sustainable settlement. The federation 
process seeks to incorporate parts of the eastern regions of Somaliland 
in Puntland and the rest of Somaliland as one of the clan-based constit-
uent states of the federation. This is totally unacceptable to Somaliland. 
The federal constitution divides Somalia into five constituent states. 
The leadership of two of the five states in Somalia, that is Puntland and 
Jubaland, are dominated by core Darood kin subgroups. The Hawiye 
sub-kin similarly form the leadership of Hirshabelle and Galmudug. 
The fifth state of South West Somalia is home to the core sub-kin of 
Digil iyo Mirifle and Dir. Furthermore, all five regions are home to 
minority kin groups, as well. The three kin groups in the five federal 
states account for 183 of the 275 members of the federal parliament. 
The other sub-kin account for 47 of the members and are distributed 
among the five states. The representation of the capital and the Bena-
dir region has not been determined, but its residents will claim power 
proportional to their share of the total electorate. The members of the 
federal parliament include 45 representatives allocated to Somaliland. 
Though these positions are filled by individuals of Somaliland origin, 
they have no civic connection to Somaliland. Only one of Somalia’s 
core kin groups has its homeland in Somaliland. Since Somaliland 
applies different classification of its communities, each of its major 
constituencies has a core territorial homeland in one or more of the 
country’s six pre-independence districts, which are now regions. A 
small number of the Djibouti kinship group resides in the border areas 
of Somaliland and Djibouti.  
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7.  Somaliland’s self-exclusion from externally sponsored initiatives has encouraged 
political cliques of Somaliland origin to seek inclusion in Somalia’s federal government 
and its legislative organs.
8.  Puntland claims parts of three of the five regions of Somaliland. Glamudug and 
Puntland both claim overlapping parts of the Mudug region. The third region of South 
West State, Lower Shabelle, is epicenter of the settlements of different kinship units from 
different clans. Support for al Shabaab or the federal government is part of the kinship 
leadership competition and not principled support for either the insurgency or the gov-
ernment. Jubaland State is similarly locked in competing territorial claims by local sub-
clans. The two regions of Hiram and Upper Shabelle have yet to agree to unite and form 
a state, while the legal status of the regions that form Somaliland and the capital has not 
been decided.   
9.  See UN Security Council Resolution A/2297 (2016), adopted under Chapter 7 of the 
Charter. The resolution limits its sovereignty but reaffirms its unity. The scheduled 
democratic elections in 2008, 2012, and 2016 were postponed. The new members of the 
Transitional Federal parliaments were selected on the basis of ad hoc procedures facili-
tated by representatives of the international community. In 2008, the size of the federal 
parliament was doubled on the basis of an accord mediated by the international com-
munity. In 2011, a joint meeting of IGAD and the international community mandated 
an extension of the tenure of the TFG and a roadmap for a final period of transition and 
democratic elections in 2016. The 2016 democratic elections were again postponed and 
the UN mission endorsed a leadership forum dominated by the incumbent officials of 
the federal government and heads of the regional administration. The Forum adopted 
indirect elections of the federal parliament and an upper house of state representa-
tives. The existing constituent states, which are members of the leadership forum, have 
become engaged in political disputes. Two of them, Puntland and Glamudug, are in the 
midst of violent conflicts.
10. Brief background/Introduction to AMISOM, online at Peaceau.org.
11. In Resolution 1744 (2007), the Security Council authorized the African Union mission. 
The mission has been extended periodically since then.  
12. Michael Mandelbaum, Mission Failure: America and the Post-Cold War Era (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 372.
13. There are about 58 members of Somaliland origin in the current federal parliament in 
Mogadishu. Puntland’s 66-member state assembly incudes 26 members allotted to parts 
of the two eastern regions of Somaliland, which Puntland has some claims.
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